## PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW MERCHANT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW OR LAW OF NATIONS

January 6, 2010

Please take note that in this writing, I have tried to pull in my other writings to illustrate that what I have written in the past coincides with this article. This article goes to the real depth of the law in the United States that was mentioned in "Are You Subject To", but at the time of the article, I did not have the complete understanding that I have today through experience.

The reader will also notice that there is a repeat of information. I do this on purpose to come in on the issue at a different light.

The use of private law merchant, and private international law are synonymous terms.

The use of public law merchant, and public international law are synonymous terms. This term refers to the physical laws based upon agreements of both parties.

Then there is the law of nations under international law that embraces both the private law merchant, and public law merchant.

The above is not to be confused with the UNITED NATIONS which is an unincorporated association of nations designed to divide the wealth and control population.

Also note that I use *Black's Law Dict*. 5<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> editions. I also have the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Its really not a big thing in which one you use but I do recommend having the 8<sup>th</sup> ed., if you use the older ones. I personally believe the 8<sup>th</sup> ed. is the best one. It brings you up to speed on new words and gives a more complete understanding of words, and how words change. You must get a rounded education in the law so you know the good from the bad.

I also use the terms (G)overnment as meaning the letter and strict meaning under the public corporate powers; and (g)overnment as meaning in the spirit and true meaning under the private unincorporated powers. I use the different spelling of the names as a quick, easy way to identify the two different forms.

In his treatise on the "History of Land Titles in Massachusetts", (1801), James Sullivan, former Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court at pp. 337-338 stated:

Personal estate is not fixed to any place or country, and contracts depend on the jus gentium (the general law of nations) for their origin and their expositions, rather than on any municipal regulations of particular countries.

It is observed by Justinian, that the law of nations is held in common by all the world; and that all contracts had their origin in those necessities of mankind, which urged them to buying, selling, etc. ... As personal contracts are founded in commerce, they cannot

rest on the particular laws of one country only; but ought to be the subject of those principles of the general law of nations, which are acknowledged by the world.

Huber on "Conflict of Laws" makes it very clear beyond doubt in "Praelect" pt. 2. bk. 1, tit, 3, n. 2 that any state created rights based on convenience and utility is not binding obligation or duty. Paul Voet, Huber, and John Voet all agree that laws that have extra-territorial effect rest entirely on comity. P. Voet, Statutis s. 4, c. 2, n. 7. [See H.J.R. 192 supra, also *Nortz v. U.S.* 294, 317 (1935). [Bold underline emphasis added.]

Foreign law can have no effect ipso jure outside the territory of the enacting state. <u>It must</u> be recognized or accepted, that is, incorporated by the law of the forum. [Bold underline emphasis added]

The FSIA has been incorporated into the United States as part of the law of nations under the public law merchant and is **obligatory**. The courts, both state and federal are bound to enforce the law of nations (public international law) under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as applied to NON 14<sup>th</sup> amendment citizens. To do otherwise, is to destroy thousands of years of settled law which, if tolerated, will cause the whole law system to collapse.

In the case of *Odgen v. Saunders*, 12 Wheat (24 U.S.) 213 (1827), the Court stated: "this common law of nations". The common law along with public international law, also known as public law merchant under the law of nations was established under the Articles of Confederation then into the Constitution of United States under Article VI. Thomas Jefferson said we didn't bring the common law of England, we brought the rights of man. The common law of England became entangled with the civil law of Scotland in 1707. The common law of the United States was founded upon the substance of the land of the states based upon the allodial land titles. The allodial titles threw out the feudal titles of the king. See *Wallace v. Harmstad* 44 Pa 492, (1863).

The gold and silver coins were paramount in the common law. The Constitution of U.S. specifically mentions gold and silver a legal tender in "Payment of Debt" in Article I Section 10, which also enacted the first 10 amendments, and Article III courts. The (G)overnment at that time represented a free enterprise system. There were no third parties such as the (G)overnment to compel performance of the people because the people had no contact with the federal (G)overnment. They were free and independent sovereigns. In other words, the nation wasn't bankrupt, therefore no private foreign banking system reinsuring public debt. The silver and gold didn't represent wealth; it was wealth in and of itself that made the people free. In other words, the people had public money for private debt; whereas since the bankruptcy with HJR 192, in 1933, the people have a foreign private enterprise issuing so called money for public debt that invokes Article I legislative courts through the 11<sup>th</sup> and, 14<sup>th</sup> amendments; Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2 in conjunction with the commerce clause of Article I Sec. 8 cl.3. The bankruptcy compels performance to a private enterprise system that the people call the (G)overnment, but in reality is nothing more than a private company, i.e., unincorporated association of artificial people. See Dunn & Bradstreet. When all the elected representatives are replaced with unelected bureaucrats under the executive branch, and the Congress becomes just a figure head, which is almost here,

the nation<sup>1</sup> will be locked down into a communist dictatorship untouchable by any incorporated (G)overnment.

This is Hubers doctrine in essence. This is also the stand point of the Anglo American law. See Pillet, "principles de droit international prive" Paris and Grenable, 1903; Zitelman, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT, Leipzig, Vol. 1 (2nd ed) 1912, Vol. 2 (1st ed.), 1903. See also Davies, THE INFLUENCE OF HUBERS DE CONFLICTU LEGUM ON ENGLISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 18 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 49 (1937); Lorenzen, HUBERS DE LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 136 (1947). Cf. Anton, THE INTRODUCTION INTO ENGLISH PRACTICE OF CONTINENTAL THEORIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 5 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 534 at 539 (1956). [Bold underline emphasis added.]

"Having considered the principles of the **law of nations, and the reciprocal obligations of the states under the confederation.**" Said the Chief Justice for the Court: [The court is talking about the Articles of Confederation that were in effect from March 1, 1781 to March 4, 1789.]

"It is true, that the laws of a particular country have in themselves no extra-territorial force, no coercive operation; but by the consent of nations, they acquire an influence and obligation, and, in many instances, become conclusive throughout the world. ... From the nature of the act then, it appears to be founded upon equitable grounds, for general and just purposes; it ought therefore to be regarded in all other countries, and should enjoy that weight, in our decisions, which it naturally derives from general **convenience**, **expediency**, justice, and humanity. For, mutual convenience, policy, the consent of nations, and the general principles of justice form a <u>code</u> which pervades all nations and must be everywhere acknowledged and pursued." 1 *Dell.* (Pa.) 232. Followed in *Thompson v. Young*, 1 *Dell*, (Phila Co.) 294 (1788). Cf. *Gorgerat v. McCarty*, 1 *Dall.* (Phila. Co.) 366 (1788). The interesting status of the law on this subject before *Ogden v. Saunders*, 12 Wheat (24 U.S.) 213 (1827), is well described in *Ingraham*, A VIEW OF THE INSOLVENT LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA", 2d ed., 178 (1827), and Dorsey, AMERICAN LAW OF INSOLVENCY 161 (1832). *Camp v. Lockwood*, 1 *Dall.* (Phila Co.) 393 (1788). [Bold emphasis added]

Take notice that the law of nations was recognized by the thirteen original states and in particular in the above instances, the county courts under the common law of Pennsylvania. At the time of the Articles of Confederation, there was no strong central (G)overnment, thus no uniform interpretation of the law of nations that resulted in creating trading or debt disputes between citizens of the thirteen different states, and between the states themselves and foreign nations. The code the court is talking about is public international law or public law merchant code that is the common law of nations. The Court in *Odgen v. Saunders*, supra, 12 Wheat (24 U.S.) 213 (1827), stated:

"Whilst I admit, then, that this **common law of nations**, which has been mentioned, may form in part the obligation of a contract, I must unhesitatingly insist that this law is to be taken in strict subordination to the municipal laws of the land where the contract is made or is to be executed. The former can be satisfied by nothing short of

performance [because of the <u>terms that were agreed upon</u>]; the latter may affect and control the validity, construction, evidence, remedy, performance and discharge of the contract. The former is the common law of all civilized nations and of each of them; the latter is the peculiar law of each, and is paramount to the former whenever they come in collision with each other." [Bracked part was taken from another part of the same case and inserted. The early cases had no locator numbers such as the later cases have. Bold underline emphasis added]

The *Ogden* Court is talking about contracts that have been agreed upon by both parties that are considered bilateral contracts that are the public law side of the law of nations.

In the law of public policy today, 14<sup>th</sup> amendment citizens are dealing with unilateral contracts under private international law where there is no agreement as to the terms and conditions of the contract.

The Court makes it very clear concerning bankruptcy, that the law of nations cannot override the municipal laws. I am referring to the municipal laws of Washington D.C. that were established under Article I Section 8 to the U.S. Constitution. Said municipal laws are within "the Territory" of United States and NOT "a territory" of United States. The era of *Swift v. Tyson* 16 Peters 1, (1842), to *Erie RR v. Tompkins* 304 US 64(1938), reflected Article I Section 8 under the public law merchant of the law of nations. In other words, it's NOT the municipal (G)overnment of Washington D.C. that is bankrupt.

The bankruptcy laws pertain to 14<sup>th</sup> amendment citizens of the states, NOT of the <u>Union</u> of states under Article IV Section 3 cl.1, that is the public side of the law of nations; but as a <u>federation</u> of inchoate states comprised of citizens residing in "a territory" under Article IV Section 3 cl.2, that is the private side of the law of nations. The Supreme Court in *O'Donoghue v. United States* 289 US 516, (1933), referring to Article IV Section 3 cl.2 declares "a territory" as "other property". That "other property" is the debt res that attaches to 14<sup>th</sup> amendment citizens that is <u>intangible</u>. The res comes from admirality-maritime law where a ship had repairs made to it and the owner of the ship was indebted to those who made the repairs. The repairers in response to not being paid, put a lien on the ship that created the term "quasi in rem" meaning, going against the ship (the thing in reality) while going against its owner (in reality). The ship could not be moved until the debt was paid. In other words, the (g)overnment in compelling you to perform does not go after you, they go after the res (the <u>thing incorporeal as related to a trust</u>). Said res is under Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, that is considered "other property"), and it just so happens that the res is attached to you in the spirit of the law.

In the public law of admiralty-maritime, the ship was a <u>tangible</u> thing and so was the owner. Both were subject to the letter and strict meaning of the law in the law of reality under the public side of the law of nations.

To the contrary, in the private law of admiralty-maritime the <u>res is intangible</u> and so are you in the <u>spirit of the law</u>. In today's law they don't use the term debt res, instead the term strawman is used.

Strawman as a fictitious person, specifically one that is weak or flawed. . . .

.. A third party used in some transactions as a temporary transferee to allow the principal to accomplish something that is otherwise impossible. Compare with Dummy. From *Blacks Law Dict*. 8<sup>th</sup> ed. at p. 1461. [Bold underline emphasis added]. The third party is the banking system that allows you to create debt that can never be "paid", therefore you lose your sovereignty to become a slave to those that own you. See 15 USC Chap. 41 sec. 1602 (c), (d), (e).

Admiralty-maritime law prevails to the high water mark on land. See my article in "Are You Subject To" titled,

# Admiralty-Maritime—THE LETTER AND STRICT MEANING or the SPIRIT AND TRUE MEANING UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION"

Said article explains how 14<sup>th</sup> amendment citizens become subject to admiralty-maritime law.

The following is a case of indebtedness that demonstrates extra-territorial jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, an inhabitant of Connecticut, had joined the British during the Revolution and removed to Halifax. By a decision of the County Court of 1779, rendered under the Connecticut Forfeiture Act of 1778, his estate was declared forfeited for the benefit of Connecticut. The defendant, likewise an inhabitant of Connecticut, was indebted to the plaintiff. Not having paid the debt either to the State of Connecticut or the plaintiff, he was sued by the latter after the war in Pennsylvania whereto he (the defendant) had moved. Jared Ingersoll—it will be recalled that he was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention—argued for the defendant that, because of the confiscation, the plaintiff had no right to sue. William Rawle, who was on the other side, took the view that the Connecticut confiscation law and decree were not entitled to effect in Pennsylvania.

Both lawyers made full use of the few decisions and even fewer writings then available dealing with the extra-territorial effect of legislation and conflicts problems in general. Arguing the principle of territoriality, Rawle quoted Vattel for the proposition that one nation cannot intermeddle with the government of another, Id at 396, Vattel, Law of Nations (1760). A collisio legum would arise, and the universal rule, as stated by Huber's third axiom, was that the laws and interests of the state having jurisdiction of the cause shall be preferred. 1 *Dall.*, 393 at 397, Huber's de conflictu legum, In HUBER, PRAELECTIONES JURIS CIVILIS pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3 (1689). 3 Dall. 370 n. (trans.) (1797). In reply, Ingersoll observed:

"that he did not controvert the general doctrine advanced by the opposite counsel [sic], that the **law of nations is the law of nature**<sup>2</sup> **applied to nations**, and that one sovereign power cannot be bound by another, **but he distinguished between the necessary, and the voluntary law of nations, which arises ex comitate**. *Black's Law Dict*. 5<sup>th</sup> ed. defines ex comitate as out of comity or courtesy. *Black's Law Dict*. defines "comity" as, Compliance, courtesy, respect, a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of difference and good will. Has this not revealed the dirty little secret where the presumption

of limited liability for the "payment" of debt under HJR 192 has come from? See also Title 15 USC Chap. 41 sec. 1602 (c), (d), (e), so you can be a voluntary slave to an unincorporated communist dictatorship. Vatt. pref. 12 Ibid. p. 6. and insisted that the **law of nations** actually enforced, are everywhere **obligatory**, **unless they interfere with the independency of another Legislature.** Any laws, state or federal, that have no enacting clauses do not interfere with the public side of the law of nations under the FSIA.<sup>3</sup>

2 Hub. 26. For, common convenience renders it necessary to give a certain degree of force to the statutes of foreign nations. 2 *Ld. Kaim. Prin. Eq.* 350, 360. 1 *Dall.* (Phila. Co.) 393 at 396 (1788). [Bold emphasis added]

#### He further remarked:

... the operation and effect of a sentence, or judgment, of a foreign Court cannot surely be more binding than the act of a foreign legislature; and these, ex comitate et jure gentium, are in many cases final. 1 *Black. Rep.* 258, 262. Vatt. lib. 2. c. 7. sec. 84. p. 147. 1 *Dall.* (Phila Co.) 393 at 396 (1788).

#### And he concluded:

"It is true, that the American States have hithereto been held by a very slight confederacy; but what remedy is to be pursued? Shall we, if the knot is loose, make it still looser? ... [W]hen a more perfect reason of experience would justify such a construction; and the United States, though individually sovereign and independent, must admit, not only the **voluntary law of nations** but a **peculiar law resulting from their relative situations.**" *Id.* at 389. [Bold emphasis added]

See bankruptcy of United States as evidenced by HJR 192 and *Erie RR v. Tompkins* 304 US 64 supra, that made the private law merchant of bills, notes, and checks, the law of the land under public policy. The use of said commercial paper is enforced through the commerce clause of Article I Sec. 8 cl.3, 11<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> amendments in Article I legislative courts that enforce administrative codes and regulations that have no enacting clauses.

#### The *Clearfield Trust* case stated:

"We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the rule of *Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64, does not apply to this action. **The rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law.** When the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or power... In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards...

merchant, developed for about a century under the regime of *Swift v. Tyson*, 16 Pet. 1, (1842-1938), represented general commercial law public law merchant under Article III courts rather than a choice of a federal rule designed to protect a federal right, private law merchant under the 11<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> amendments and the *Erie RR* doctrine that includes diversity of citizenship; and is referred to as local law that is enforced under Article I legislative courts it nevertheless stands as a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal questions." *Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S.* 318 U.S. 363, 336-367 (1943). Taken from the "Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of United States, II." p. 803 Univ. Pa Law Review, by Dickinson (1953). [bold underline emphasis added]

In summation, the law is very clear that the law of nations had its roots established in the states before the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of United States existed. International law in United States is American as apple pie.

#### **CORPORATE UNITED STATES**

Former Chief Justice John Marshall *in United States v. Maurice* (U.S.) 26 Fed Cas. 1211, stated, at page 1216:

"The United States is a government, and consequently a body politic and corporate, capable of attaining the objects for which it was created by the means which are necessary for their attainment. This great corporation was ordained and established by the American people, and endowed by them with great powers, for important purposes." Quoted *In re Merriam's Estate*, 36 N.E. 505, 506, 141 N.Y. 479. [Bold print added]

In addition to basing the power of Congress on this provision of the Constitution, it was Marshall, in *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 4 Wheat (US) 316, 411, 4 L. ed. 59, (1816) who said:

"The power of creating a corporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, is not, like the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent power which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing them. It is never the end for which other powers are exercised, but a means by which other objects are accomplished." Quoted in *Luxton v. North River Bridge Co.*, 153 US 525, 529, 38 L ed. 808. 14 S Ct 891, upholding a Congressional corporation of a bridge company to build a bridge over the North River between New York and New Jersey. [Bold underline added]

The American People created the public National corporation; the public National corporation did not create the people. As the Preamble says: "We the People in Order to form a more perfect Union ....." Notice it says "Union" meaning Union of states under the common law that was identified by Article I section 10 that was incorporated under the Constitution of United States of America; and not a federation of inchoate states that exists

**today under the civil law** as noted in *O'Donoghue v. United States* 289 US 516. Article I Section 10 established public money for the "payment" of private debt as per the National Coinage Act of April 2, 1792 at Statute I United States Statutes at Large Chap. XVI Section I. "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, and it is hereby enacted and declared, . . ."

The corporate (G)overnment of the United States under the public side of the law of nations absolutely has no power over citizens who have not become subject to the "implied" powers of the private side of the United States (g)overnment. In other words, "other objects" are considered "other property" as described in *O'Donoghue v. United States* concerning Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2. In other words, Judge Marshall in *McCulloch v. Maryland said*, it is impossible for the corporate (G)overnment to compel sovereign citizens of the Union of states to perform to any "implied" powers and that includes taxation and the regulation of commerce. See *The Propeller Genesee Chief* case quoted in *Verlinden v. Bank of Nigeria*. 461 U.S. 496 (1983). See "implied" and "objects" in *Black's Law Dict*. Sovereign citizens of the state does not include being eligible for the benefits of the public debt.

The FSIA has been incorporated into the United States as part of the law of nations under the public law merchant and is <u>obligatory</u>. The corporate structure of the States must remain <u>perpetual as declared by Section XIII of the Articles of Confederation</u>, therefore the (G)overnment must enforce the rights of real NON franchised sovereign citizens. The courts, both state and federal are bound to enforce the law of nations (public international law) under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as applied to NON 14<sup>th</sup> amendment citizens. To do otherwise, is to destroy thousands of years of settled law which if tolerated, will cause the whole law system to collapse.

The difference between the new world order, and the old world order, is the rise of communism in an unincorporated association under private enterprise. That association has as its slaves, 14<sup>th</sup> amendment citizens based upon the law of trusts and unilateral contracts. Said citizens have agreed with the bankruptcy of their nation to become "subject to" a **quasi** corporate privilege<sup>4</sup> brought about by HJR 192. That privilege is the private side of the law of nations (private law merchant or private international law), that is evidenced by people using demand deposit accounts of the private side of the banking system. Without disclaimers, the use of demand deposit accounts automatically enacts Title 15 USC Chap. 41 sec. 1602 (c), (d), (e), where "persons" have agreed never to demand "payment" of debt. "Forgive our debts as we forgive our debtors." Because of HJR 192, the privilege of limited liability continues on to their offspring under the laws of limited liability and perpetual succession, two attributes of corporations. In other words, a corporation is not responsible for its debts. It can declare bankruptcy and dump its debts on to the people. Regarding perpetual succession, the corporation can exist forever as long as the state will renew its charter as an artificial entity.

#### STATE CORPORATIONS

Corporations created by the states are "persons" but not citizens. Sovereign people created the state, the state creates the corporation. A corporation cannot create itself. If everybody since 1933, are considered artificial persons, who then created the state franchised corporation? The

answer seems to be, nobody. If that is the case, the state created corporations will perish in and of themselves because they cannot exist without their creator, the NON franchised real sovereign citizen that created them. The answer lies in the following U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1937, four years after HJR 192 in 1933.

A State of the United States is not a "state" under international law since by its constitutional status it does not have capacity to conduct foreign relations. United States alone, not any of its constituent States, enjoys international sovereignty and nationhood. "In respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. <u>As to such purposes the State does not exist.</u>" *United States v. Belmont*, 301 U.S. 324, (1937).[Bold emphasis added].

Public policy has it that there are no sovereign citizens of the state therefore, the state as a member of the Union no longer exists, thus, the state corporation is a creation of the federated unincorporated association. This is why state created corporations can pack up and move to a foreign country. See more on state corporations infra.

### ONE WORLD QUASI CORPORATE MONOLITH

Please take note that in the past, I said "One World Corporate Monolith". As I starting working on this writing, I discovered that was not quite right. The term should be ONE WORLD **QUASI** CORPORATE MONOLITH.

The corporate (G)overnment of the United States under the public side of the law of nations absolutely has no power over citizens who have not become subject to the "implied" powers of the private side of the United States (g)overnment. In other words, "other objects" are considered "other property" as described in *O'Donoghue v. United States* (1933), concerning Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2. The words, "implied" and "other objects" are used in the above *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 4 Wheat (US) 316, 411, 4 L. ed. 59, (1816) case.

The powers that be that control the wealth of the world have used the ear marks of corporate law to create a private unincorporated association for their own use so they can store their wealth behind an illusionary veil<sup>5</sup> that gives them eternal life, wealth, power, and no taxes that the average human being cannot even begin to comprehend. These powers have created all of the materialism by taking over the money system, and creating the illusion of money in the form of debt that they created out of thin air so as to enslave the people, and now are in the process of taking away that materialism. This is being accomplished through green environmentalism that will force the people off the land with high taxes, and restrictions on its use. The result will be living in high rise buildings in the cities where forced birth control will be the order of the day. Said birth control policy has already been experimented with in China and is coming to America as admitted, by one member of the Obama administration thereby reducing everybody to absolute serfdom untouchable by any corporate (G)overnment.

#### **AUTO INDUSTRY AND THE STATE**

It appears that the collapse of the auto industry was designed to set the plan in motion that in the end, there will be only three auto manufactures' left in the world. For the sake of an example, Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors, were founded before 1933 where public policy demanded public money for private debt. Since 1933, public policy has changed; we now have private money (debt/credit) for public debt. Prior to 1933, those were private corporations created and run by private executives. The (G)overnment was not involved other than issuing a state franchise by the people of the state out of the secretary of state's office. For that privilege of receiving the franchise, the state imposes taxes on the corporations. Now the idea is to bankrupt those corporations, and have them reconstructed with the public's debt to form an unincorporated association with the federal (g)overnment with federal bailout money, regardless if they paid it back or not. In other words, before 1933, the people were considered sovereigns even though they were 14th amendment citizens because by operation of law, the money was still considered public money for private debt that was evidenced by Swift v. Tyson 16 Peters 1 (1842 to 1938) with the Erie RR decision. Since HJR 192 and Erie RR, the people of the states are bankrupt not capable of establishing auto corporations within the state because they are not sovereigns. The sovereigns that created the Union were of the states and not the federal (G)overnment. In other words, the states in the Union created the federal (G)overnment.

Regardless of where the corporation is created, all corporations join some sort of an unincorporated association to further their business enterprise. In other words, since 1933, the corporation created in the state is not created by the state that is incorporated in the Union; but by the private federation of states joined together in an unincorporated association. The whole state bureaucracy in and of itself is a private unincorporated association. That is why their names are spelled with all capital letters. That association created; not the state corporation as created by the sovereign people; but by a bankrupt society that has as their god the world bankers that created the strawman out of nothing called materialism. In other words, public policy has become the natural law as noted in footnote #2 because the people have accepted the fact that the so called money was created out of nothing thereby creating a decaying static society; as opposed to a dynamic living society.

Think about this. Is this what the powers that be have in mind in their quest of a no competition society? See my article on Silver that I sent to a friend of mine on Dec. 7, 2009, amended January 2, 2010, to reflect today's discoveries. Is it any wonder that Thomas Jefferson, and may I remind the reader, that our country is Jeffersonian, said, that if a group of private bankers issue our money, the tyranny that will follow will take 2000 years to overthrow.

The answer to the tyranny that is upon us is for public policy to demand the return of our public money for private debt. In the meantime each individual has the right to disassociate him or herself from this tyranny. Yes, the American people instead of looking within themselves for liberty, freedom, security and wealth, have looked outward to something or someone where they are now five minutes away from having none of the above. The people have learned nothing from history, they just keep repeating it over and over again.

That said privilege compels performance and consumption to the One World Quasi Corporate Monoliths goods and services untouchable by any (G)overnment. In other words, there will not be any competition, only a few select corporations will replace the (G)overnment with nothing

more than unelected mindless bureaucrats who are willing to help establish a 2000 year dictatorship that is being established this very day, even at the expense of their offspring.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is not the common law of the states; it is the product of the public side of the law of nations (public law merchant or public international law) that insures the sovereignty of the individual as NON 14<sup>th</sup> amendment citizens while in commerce.<sup>7</sup> See my article on "Bonds, Debts, Notes, Money".

Under the Articles of Confederation there was no central control of the value of money. The lack of central control allowed all kinds of valuations of said money. In other words, a coin in Georgia would have a different value than say in New York. There was no mention of the words, gold, silver, or tender. It does use the term "payment" but it doesn't say what the coins are to be made of. All these things created restrictions on commerce.<sup>8</sup>

In the public side of the law merchant under the law of nations, "payment" of debt could be deferred by accepting a note that could be taken to the bank to demand and receive "payment". The idea of the note was to solve the restrictions placed on commerce because of the states common law rule of "payment" on the spot.

The FSIA was a result of the original thirteen states recognizing the law of nations that the FSIA can be brought in the state courts. The states, and not the federal (G)overnment, were the originators of recognizing the law of nations

The FSIA is a public Act that can only be accessed by NON 14<sup>th</sup> amendment citizens because they are NOT considered "other property" under Article IV Sec. 3. Cl.2. Said citizens are the only ones who have direct access to Article III courts to the Constitution; whereas the Congress stands between 14<sup>th</sup> amendment citizens because they are treated as "other property" under Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, thus committed to Article I legislative courts.

Congress was bound by international law to enact the FSIA in order to provide a statutory remedy to overcome the *Erie RR v. Tompkins* doctrine because of changing times as regards both domestic and world commerce. You must keep in mind that the states were under the Articles of Confederation, and that said Articles were then incorporated by reference into the U.S. Constitution by Article VI and enforced by Article III courts under Section 2 in law and equity.

I guess the best way to look at what is happening is to think of a balloon in the shape of a wiener that has air in it. If you squeeze one end, the other end bulges out, and visa versa. In other words, the same principles apply in the law. The more one policy becomes doctorial, there is available another policy that offers a solution.

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